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Abstract—Cloud storage provides the simpler way to share the 
files privately and publicly. A good Cloud Storage Provider 
(SCP) is not only measured by the access speed or file size that 
can be shared to others, but also regarding the security issues in 
file sharing itself. In this paper, we analyze the security of file 
sharing in 3 Chinese CSPs, which are: Baidu, Weiyun and 
Kanbox. Those CSPs have their own vulnerabilities that 
successfully revealed. We also provide some suggestions to 
countermeasure the weaknesses so that they can maintain the 
quality while improving the security.  
Keywords— cloud computing, cloud storage, file sharing, 
security  
I.  Introduction  
Inside the cloud computing system, there is a cloud service 
that earlier it was very famous to be classified as: Software as 
a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) dan 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). Along with the advance 
technology and invention, currently there is no category on 
cloud service. Those now are in one category, called 
Everything-as-a-Service (XaaS) [1]. It is because most of the 
CSPs (Cloud Service Provider) now combine those 3 services 
or sometime plus some other services, such as: Storage as a 
Service, Network as a Service or even Monitoring as a 
Service, and then provide it to users as one bundled system.  
One of cloud computing products that currently booming 
in many parts of the world, is Cloud Storage. It has been 
experiencing the tremendous growth in the past 5 years. In 
China, there is a kinds of war when many giant IT companies 
suddenly create a new product and become Cloud Storage 
Provider (CSP), and trying to get as many as possible users by 
promoting their product massively with offering some 
extraordinary features [2].  
When the western CSP are offering free capacity to the 
new users around 1 to 2 digits of Giga Bytes, the Chinese 
CSPs are currently offering free capacity around 1 to 2 digits 
of Tera Bytes. At least there are 4 CSPs that have such kinds 
of special promotion. However, size of capacity is not the only 
consideration that users should think firstly. The security level 
becomes urgent when the cloud storage is used to save the 
private data. 
This paper consists of 6 sections. The 2nd section will 
discuss about cloud storage. The 3rd section will give the 
discussion in more details about sharing methods in CSP. The 
security in CSP, especially in term of file sharing, will be 
explained thoroughly in the 4th section. Assessment and 
Suggestion will be in the 5th section and followed by the 
Conclusion as a last one. 
II. Cloud Storage 
The existence of cloud storage is very important 
nowadays. The need for this service is getting bigger and 
bigger, as they provide the easiness for the people to access, 
synchronize, share and backup data easily. Users will be able 
to access their digital content any time, from anywhere, and 
with any device (smartphone, tablet, notebook, or desktop PC) 
[3]. 
Since some western CSPs were blocked in China, some 
local CSPs raised with fantastic offer, such as: Baidu (up to 
2TB storage capacity), Alibaba Kanbox (up to 10TB) and 
Tencent Weiyun (up to 10TB) for free. Such offer is tempting 
so many people especially in China and it is successfully make 
them ignore the dropbox, googledrive, etc. But actually, no 
matter how large the capacity offered, the security issue 
cannot be denied that it is still very important things to be 
considered. As mentioned by Zhou et al [4] in their paper, 
security and privacy issue is regarded as a top concern among 
9 challenges in cloud computing system.  
Cryptographic mechanism is used to secure all 
communication between users and CSPs, such as uploading 
and downloading the data [5] [3]. Another security aspect that 
should be given more attention is the security of file sharing 
[3]. It is not a small thing that will not bring a serious problem 
to the users. When we begin to share the file, it means that we 
are ready to take all risk for that. The fact is, by sharing the 
files with some other users, sometimes it opens security hole. 
The afterwards discussion will explain the situation by 
analyzing 3 popular Chinese CSPs, those are: baidu [6], 
weiyun [7] and kanbox [8]. 
III. Sharing Methods on Cloud 
Storage 
The importance of sharing features in cloud storage is to 
make the sharing file becomes much easier without using 
email attachments which sometimes have limitation in term of 
file size [9]. On the other hand, sharing methods in cloud 
storage also have some functionality which does not exist in 
sharing through email.  
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According to Chu et al [3], there are 3 kinds of sharing 
methods in cloud storage (see table I). Here we will discuss it 
one by one and get to know the sharing methods provided by 3 
CSPs which being focused on this research. 
TABLE I.  FILE SHARING METHODS USED BY BAIDU, WEIYUN AND 
KANBOX 
Types Baidu Weiyun Kanbox 
Public Sharing    
Private Sharing    
Secret URL Sharing    
 
A. Public Sharing 
There’s no access control on this kind of sharing method. 
The data is intended for the public, so anyone can get the data 
without any authentication or authorization. In this scenario, 
the data owner can generate the URL of the document and 
publish it on the website. Afterwards anyone on the internet 
can access or even download this document directly through 
the given URL. In another scenario, the contents that shared 
publicly on some CSPs can be accessed through Google 
search as well.  
Weiyun does not have the public sharing option. Anyone 
who wants to access the documents stored inside the Weiyun 
Cloud Storage, they have to sign-in first, except for the image 
file. Here, anyone can still see the image with the medium 
resolution without sign-in to CSP. But they are required to 
have the account when they want to access the image with real 
resolution.  On the contrary, both baidu and kanbox have this 
option. 
B. Private Sharing 
Authentication is required here. Firstly, the owner must 
specify who will get the access for the data. Afterwards the 
CSP will authenticate anyone which trying to access the data 
whether they are in the list or not. They must sign-in first, and 
their identity usually will be shown on the owner’s CSP 
window. 
Among the 3 Chinese CSPs, only Kanbox that does not 
have private sharing option. It only provides sharing method 
through public URL and via e-mail. On the other hand, private 
sharing method is provided in Baidu and Weiyun. 
C. Secret-URL Sharing 
Secret-URL Sharing can be a bridge between public and 
private sharing. The URL of public sharing is not distributed 
in a secret way. While private sharing, it is a secret way but 
need the account to access it. By being the middle option, 
Secret-URL Sharing provides the secret distribution with the 
open access account.  
In this method, the URL of documents that is going to be 
shared will be distributed secretly through private way, such as 
e-mail. So, only the one who received the e-mail from data’s 
owner can access the contents without further authentication 
or authorization. This option is available in Baidu and 
Kanbox. 
Weiyun actually does have the option to share the URL 
through e-mail. However, it cannot be categorized as a Secret-
URL Sharing since anyone who receives the email remains 
required to sign-in with QQ or Weiyun account. 
D. File Sharing Security 
File sharing in cloud storage is one of the most interesting 
topics to be discussed, in which the mechanism of this method 
is different compared to file sharing via email attachment. By 
using e-mail attachment, the shared data from Allice will 
permanently exist in Bob’s e-mail storage. But in cloud 
storage, Allice can decide when she will open and close the 
door to share the documents anytime. It is depend on the 
features provided by CSPs. 
According to Chu et al. (2013) [3], there are 8 parameters 
that can be used to assess the security of CSPs in term of data 
sharing. By using those 8 plus 1 additional parameter, this 
paper is going to reveal the security hole of 3 Chinese CSPs, 
those are: Baidu, Weiyun and Kanbox. 
E. Non-Dead URL 
This parameter refers to the link that remains working 
when the file has been updated, deleted or even replaced by a 
new one with the same name.  
In this case, Weiyun apparently does not change the URL 
when the file has been updated. Suppose that Allice wan to 
share a document with Bob by using secret-URL sharing. Bob 
will do have the access to her file permanently as long as that 
file is existing. If they both are using Weiyun, then Bob will 
be able to access the file even though it has been updated 
many times by Allice. When Allice deletes the file, then it will 
be ended. The URL on the Bob’s pocket will be deactivated.  
It is probably good news when Allice works together with 
Bob and she shares the document through Weiyun. Bob will 
be able to monitor the progress of Allice because he can get 
the up-to-date version of the document with one single link 
only. But in another scenario, it could be dangerous when 
Allice does not have intention to share the documents 
permanently. She might do not realize with the situation in 
which Bob can easily collect a lot of information without her 
permission, by monitoring the update on Allice’s document. 
TABLE II.  NONDEAD URL 
URL still active when: Baidu Weiyun Kanbox 
Update    
Delete    
Replace (creating a new file 
with the same name) 
   
 
On the other hand, Baidu and Kanbox have the more 
secure way about it. The URL is not a “NonDead” link since 
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they will change the URL when there is an update on the file. 
(See Table II). 
F. Uncertain Identities 
The objective of private sharing is to make sure that only 
the authorized people can access the data. But in fact, not all 
CSPs follow this rule. The owner should be able to see the 
identity of the users who access the data. But sometimes, there 
are some security holes so that the owner cannot identify it 
easily as explained by Chu et al in their paper [3].  
Let say Allice shares the URL to Bob and John by using 
private sharing. Since Bob has 2 accounts in this CSP, then 
Bob tries to sign-in with his second account who has not listed 
in Allice data yet. After Bob has successfully signed-in, Allice 
will be curious with that strange account. If only 2 accounts 
that the file is shared with, it could be easy to confirm whether 
this strange account belongs to Bob or John. But, what if we 
share the document to more than 50 or hundred peoples? It 
would be difficult to clarify once we found the uncertain 
identities. Among 3 CSPs, it is only Kanbox who does not 
have the private sharing methods. So Kanbox will be ignored 
in this part. 
Baidu provides the private sharing method. Here, data 
owner can share the document to the colleagues that have been 
registered and listed as “good friends” (好友). And anyone 
who has listed as a “good friends”, it is confirmed that they 
already have the Baidu’s account before. Once Allice wants to 
share the document with others, she only needs to pick it from 
the “good friends” list and the notification will be sent 
privately to the expected users. Suppose that Bob has 2 
Baidu’s accounts, and Allice has sent the notification to his 
first account, then he can only access the data from his first 
account. Here, the shared data will only appear on the selected 
users account (required to sign-in), and there is no specific 
URL appears when the shared data is being accessed. The 
peoples who have the privilege to access the data will be 
shown on the Data Sharing Window with some modifications 
to hide and protect the full identity.  
Example 1: 
“username@email.com”, will be shown as 
“us…e@email.com” 
Discussing about Weiyun, actually the user interface of 
Weiyun CSP is very simple. There are only few features 
included. Especially on sharing mechanism, it provides 2 
options only, those are: by url” and “by mail”. There is no 
specific option to do private sharing. However, it is 
compulsory to sign-in first using QQ or Weiyun account to 
access the shared file. This condition is suitable with the 
requirement of private sharing where the users need to have an 
account access. By this reason, Weiyun is considered have the 
private sharing method. 
Consider that Allice wants to share the document with Bob 
by choosing “by mail” option, and then Bob click the link and 
sign-in to the Weiyun CSP, it still difficult to identify who are 
accessing that document. There is no list of peoples who have 
privilege to the document. Allice is unable to check whether 
Bob has accessed it or not. Even Allice is also unable to 
maksure that Bob accessed the file using his own account or 
not. And it is also impossible for Allice to know whether there 
is any other person or not accessing her shared file. 
G. Unauthorized Resharing 
Unauthorized Ressharing is the condition where Allice has 
shared a link to Bob privately, but Bob turns out re-shares 
again to others, and it is still possible for others to re-share 
again many times. Allice cannot control the link once she 
releases the URL, both publicly and privately.  
This parti is also for the CSPs that have private sharing 
feature. Once again, Kanbox will be ingnored. 
On Baidu, there is a private way to share the data. No one 
can open the door if they are not invited by the owner. Bob 
can receive the shared file from Allice but no way to do direct 
re-sharing. If Bob wants to do such action, he has to keep the 
file first to his cloud storage then share it manually. But it is a 
different scenario. 
Weiyun differs from Baidu in term of this parameter. 
There is no private way provided by Weiyun. Anyone can 
access the link given by the owner as long as they sign-in to 
Weiyun Cloud Storage account. The owner can send the link 
to some expected colleagues. But in the same time, the owner 
cannot control if one of those colleagues is trying to re-share 
the given link by spreading from their account. This condition 
allows for what so called “Unauthorized Resharing”. 
H. Indiscriminate Accessing URL 
It is happened when there is no difference between URL 
used by Allice (as an owner) and Bob to access the file. On 
their paper, Chu et al [3] mentioned that Google Drive have 
such kind of weakness. They illustrate that if Alice is in a 
meeting and accesses her file while using a projector, the URL 
will be shown in the browser’s address bar. It is dangerous 
since in Google Drive, any file is accessed via the associated 
URL, even for the file owner. 
Unlike a Google Drive, these 3 Chinese CSPs are showing 
the page’s URL, not file’s URL on the address bar of web 
browser. This kind of URL is relatively safer and inaccessible 
by the unauthorized user. 
I. Non-HTTPS URL for Sharing 
HTTPS is important to secure the communication line in 
internet era. It protects not only the transmission of the 
involved data but also the resource locator [3]. HTTPS 
actually is combination of HTTP and SSL/TLS to secure the 
communication between Web browser and Web server, 
especially to prevent the kinds of web attacks, including 
eavesdropping [10] [11].  
Unfortunately, these 3 Chinese CSPs are not using the 
HTTPS as their communication protocol, so that the integrity 
and confidentiality of the data are at stake. 
 324 
International Journal of Advances in Computer Science & Its Applications– IJCSIA 
Volume 5 : Issue 2         [ISSN : 2250-3765] 
Publication Date: 30 October, 2015 
 
J. Non-HTTPS Shortened URL 
URL Shortening is a technique to decrease significantly 
the length of the URL so that the URL becomes easy to read, 
remember and share [12]. When the website is accessed from 
the mobile phone, then the user will very easy to copy-paste, 
share or even to spell the URL.  
There is only one CSP among 3 Chinese CSPs being 
studied in this paper that have URL Shortening feature, called 
Weiyun. However, as mentioned in the previous discussion, 
Weiyun does not use the secure protocol for the 
communication between client and server. 
K. No Privacy on Sharing 
On private sharing, this term means anyone who are 
invited to enjoy the shared file can also see other people 
identities with no filter, i.e. full email address as happened in 
Dropbox and Google Drive [3]. It is dangerous if other users 
do not have good intentions to exploit this weakness for the 
sake of them. Since the problem relates to private sharing, then 
Kanbox will be ignored on this discussion. 
Talking about Baidu and Weiyun, both of them cannot be 
considered that they are running “No Privacy on Sharing”. 
Baidu does not have this weakness. But, it does not mean that 
Baidu has a very powerfull security. This is simply because 
Baidu do not have the feature to show the people who 
connected to the shared files. While on the Weiyun, the invited 
guests will be listed neatly and safely. It is only email address 
of the inviter that will be shown completely. Other email 
address will be secured by hiding some characters of account 
name (see Example 1). 
L. Sharing of Trash Files 
A serious problem happened in Google Drive when the 
people still can access the file that has been deleted and store it 
into trash folder [3]. Alice deletes the file probably because 
she does not want to share it anymore. But unfortunately she 
might be not aware that people can still access it even in the 
trash. 
After we analyzed the 3 Chinese CSPs, we conclude that 
all of them are free from this problem. Baidu and Kanbox will 
change the URL every time when changes happened. They 
automatically deactivate the previous link that has been shared 
before. On the other hand, Weiyun still maintain the same link 
if owner only update the contents. But when owner deletes the 
file, then the link will be removed automatically. 
M. Fixed URL 
The scenario of this parameter according to Chu et al [3] is 
as follows: 
Suppose that Allice has shared the URL publicly, but then 
suddenly she changes her mind and she wants to share it 
privately, so what happened with the previous URL?  
Chu et al [3] reported that Google Drive uses the same 
URL for that scenario. It is unsecure since now Allice wants to 
categorize the file as a private, but in fact the URL has been 
widely spread as public URL. If earlier Bob already got the 
link when Allice made it open for public, then now Bob can 
still access this secret file. Allice probably does not aware with 
this situation. 
On Baidu, for the scenario above, the file turns out still 
accessible using public URL. So, it is like no privilege, once 
the URL has been publicly shared. But there is good news that 
Baidu provides a feature to cancel the file sharing. If Alice 
cancels the public sharing in advance, then it will be secure 
when she wants to re-share it privately. 
On the other hand, Weiyun and Kanbox both cannot be 
measured using this parameter, because Weiyun does not have 
public sharing feature, whereas Kanbox does not provide the 
private sharing feature. 
IV. Assessments and Suggestions 
According to the prior discussion, we provide a table that 
can explain the vulnerabilities of 3 Chinese CSP, namely: 
Baidu, Weiyun and Kanbox, in a simpler way (see Table III). 
TABLE III.  SECURITY ASSESSMENTS OF BAIDU, WEIYUN AND KANBOX 
Vulnerabilities Baidu Weiyun Kanbox 
Non-Dead URL    
Uncertain Identities    
Unauthorized Resharing    
Indiscriminate Accessing URL    
Non-HTTPS URL for Sharing    
Non-HTTPS Shortened URL    
No Privacy on Sharing    
Sharing of Trash Files    
Fixed URL    
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The assessments and suggestions regarding the security 
weaknesses of 3 Chinese CSPs will be discussed as follows: 
Baidu and Kanbox do the good way, whereas Weiyun 
should be more careful about the “Non-Dead URL” issue. 
So, to the best of our knowledge, the link should be 
invalidated when the file is changed (updated or removed). 
The CSPs can also provide the option when the owner wants 
to share the live file, so that people can access the updated 
file anytime without changing the URL. 
It is better to implement the private sharing methods as 
provided by Baidu, since it can make sure that the file is 
only accessed by the invited people with the registered 
account. However, especially for the owner, it is important 
to consider that owner should be able to check which users 
that currently on-line and accessing the shared file. 
Baidu has a good security system against “unauthorized 
re-sharing”. There is no URL exposed in private sharing, 
and it can reduce the possibility to do unauthorized re-
sharing. Other CSPs are recommended to implement such 
kind of private sharing method. If insisted using URL on 
private sharing, then they have to provide another security 
method to generate the URL that can be accessed once only. 
Once the users accept the invitation and sign-in to their 
account, then the URL will be deactivated immediately [3]. 
These 3 Chinese CSPs are using the different URL for 
sharing and for owner. It means that, they provide a good 
security against “indiscriminate accessing URL”. 
Up to the writing of this paper is completed, we have not 
yet found the reason why these Chinese CSPs are not using 
HTTPS as their protocol. Since cloud storage is involving 
client-server system and private data, it is required to secure 
the communication line by implementing HTTPS. 
Chu et al mentioned that no shortening service supports 
SSL, so “secret” URLs should not be shortened [3]. 
Howevery, security is more important than Beauty. 
When the owner deletes the file from the cloud, the link 
to this file should be disabled immediately [3]. These 
Chinese CSPs are implementing such kind of concept so 
they are free from this threat. 
Baidu provides a proper way in private sharing, 
especially regarding “no privacy on sharing” issue. But it is 
better if owner can choose whether he or she will allow 
other people to see the sharing list of the shared file or not 
[3]. 
The URL should not be fixed when there is a change in 
sharing method. CSPs have to be careful for such 
unexpected vulnerability, and they have to make sure that 
every changing on sharing settings will be followed by the 
changing of URL of the shared file. Among these 3 Chinese 
CSPs, only Baidu that can be measured using this issue and 
it can handle it well. Later, when Weiyun and Kanbox are 
going to provide both public and private sharing, we suggest 
to consider such security hole. Baidu can be the good model 
for countermeasures this problem. 
V. Conclusion 
Recently, storage media have been experiencing the 
tremendous growth, which are now widely available the 
virtual hard drive, namely Cloud Storage. On the other hand, 
file sharing is a kind of daily activity that cannot be denied 
by those who are active in using Information and 
Technology product.  
These 2 things currently have a close relationship where 
cloud storage can make the sharing process become simpler. 
However, we should aware for all kinds of vulnerabilities 
that may be not previously realized. 
This paper was discussing about the security of file 
sharing system on Cloud Storage, especially by analyzing 3 
Chinese CSPs: Baidu, Weiyun and Kanbox. Depart from the 
basic of some parameters proposed by Chu et al [3], we did 
some experiments to test their security in file sharing. As a 
result, there were some vulnerabilities found in each CSP 
that can be seen in Table 3. 
Baidu, Weiyun and Kanbox have their own 
vulnerabilities. By looking at the Table 3, at least users will 
know the security level of each CSP, especially in term of 
file sharing system. Once more, discussing the security of 
the system is very interesting since there is no perfect 
system. By this research, it is mandatory for users to be 
careful when they share the files in the cloud. 
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